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“Have we not an equal interest with the men of this nation?” 
Gender, Equality, and Genesis in John Locke's Political Thought 
 
            John Locke (1632-1704) is a seminal figure in modern political thought, of this fact, 
most, if not all readers of this article would agree. Beyond this observation, however, there is an 
almost dizzying array of diverse interpretations and disagreement as to the meaning, intent, and 
significance of his work.  As Paul Sigmund, the editor of a recent critical edition of Locke’s 
works notes, in looking at Locke “there is something for everyone,” to either condemn or to 
praise in often contradictory readings of his classic texts.1 A reader can find proof of a “covert 
Hobbesian or an apologist for unrestrained accumulation of property,” although there is plenty in 
his corpus to contradict any narrow view of Locke as “hedonist, materialist, atomistic 
individualist, collectivist, deist, secularist, advocate of majority tyranny, and naïve believer in 
human perfectibility.”2   Controversial interpretations of John Locke’s views that Sigmund’s 
critical edition describes as “refuted” still have their defenders.3  
       The authors of this study hope to make a contribution to Locke scholarship that emphasizes 
above all the importance of understanding and evaluating Locke within his historical context. To 
that end, the methodological commitment of this study is both textual and contextual. In other 
words, the primary text needs to be read closely and within the context of seventeenth-century 
social and political assumptions.  Specifically, with regard to the issues discussed here, it is 
crucial that Locke first describes the pre-political State of Nature as a situation within which “all 
the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal.”4  Locke’s working assumption was that in all instances 
human societies are formed by social interaction, not à la Hobbes by isolated survivalists, but 
rather by people who even without a sovereign state would already, and “by nature,”  be engaged 
in a set of  relationships including economic, familial, and even religious ties.  None of these are 
1
Skidmore-Hess and Skidmore-Hess: “Have we not an equal interest with the men of this nation?”
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository,
  
at any point in Locke’s corpus described as dependent upon the order created by the will of the 
sovereign.  Indeed, the “inconveniences” that Locke continues on to describe as typical of the 
state of nature presume that not only does human society exist in nature but so to do the norms, 
the laws that govern us at all times and in all places.5 
      By approaching Locke’s understanding of politics as fundamentally “reciprocal” patterns of 
“power and jurisdiction” one can better appreciate the crucial role that gender relations play in 
his outlook and gain critical insight into his concept of natural equality.  Locke, as Nancy 
Hirschmann describes “in some ways … provides the foundation for liberal feminism. But his 
gender politics are somewhat inconsistent, suggesting that women have at best an uncertain and 
incomplete relationship to liberty.”6 These ambiguities are described in further detail below, 
however the point here is not only that Locke provides an ambiguous legacy with regard to the 
natural rights and equality of women, but that one cannot fully grasp the whole pattern of his 
political philosophy without attending to the natural in/equality he describes between women and 
men.   
     The main contribution of this study is to describe the ambiguities and interplay of equality 
and inequality in Locke’s discussions of gender.  He is at once proto-feminist, an engaged 
revolutionary whose politics at base rested on a critique of patriarchal absolutism, yet also a man 
who at times, it seems, accepted naively (and at other times seems to fundamentally question) 
conventional patterns of male dominance. To the extent Locke’s theoretical descriptions of 
gender in/equality inform his theoretical work as whole, they would then by this account also 
help us to understand his views on such issues as class, education, and representative 
government.  While it is beyond the scope of this present work to analyze all of these 
connections, one illustration is attempted specifically Locke’s reading of the biblical book of 
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Genesis in two key texts; the First Treatise on Government and the Reasonableness of 
Christianity (1695).7  While the later text makes little mention of women as such, it notably 
repeats patterns of thought from his studies on government and thereby provides further 
illustration of the discernible ambiguities in Locke’s concept of equality.  This article focuses on 
the parallels between Locke’s political and religious texts, showing that despite some 
ambiguities, a liberal egalitarian pattern of thought recurs in his critique of patriarchal 
absolutism, property, and theology.   
 Locke’s Critique of Patriarchy 
Locke is best remembered in the history of political thought for his Second Treatise of 
Civil Government, commonly considered a foundational text of classical liberalism and modern 
conceptions of individual rights and limited sovereignty.8  Locke’s First Treatise of Civil 
Government is a less-studied critique of Robert Filmer (1588-1653), an early seventeenth-
century theoretical defender of monarchical absolutism.   The object of Locke’s criticism in the 
First Treatise is Filmer’s absolute monarchist text Patriarcha,9 written six decades prior to the 
publication date (1689) of Locke’s two treatises, although for still obscure reasons left 
unpublished until Locke’s day.  Thus it was the case that more than three decades after his death 
in 1653, Filmer was regarded as a defender of the absolute monarchy and Stuart interests with 
whom a thinker of Locke’s political sensibility would need to come to terms. 
 Filmer’s defense of absolute monarchy is predicated on a reading of scripture, which the 
Anglican Filmer presents as a counter to Roman Catholic theories of sovereignty.  In Filmer’s 
exposition, the doctrine that temporal government is based on consent is grounded in neither 
reason nor revelation, but is merely a product of medieval Scholastic sophistry.  Filmer depicts 
the Catholic theorists Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) as false 
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teachers, who would subvert the divinely ordained truths of the bible and the order and 
sovereignty of the English monarch as head of the church, state, and patriarch of a Christian 
people.  It is of interest in this context that Filmer published a review of Thomas Hobbes’s great 
work of social contract consent theory, Leviathan, in which he praises the absolutist conclusion 
that Hobbes reached.  Nonetheless, Filmer critiques Hobbes’s method for relying upon the 
doctrine of consent, “I consent with him [Hobbes] about the rights of exercising government, but 
I cannot agree to his means of acquiring it” (i.e., by consent of the governed).10   
 In Filmer’s view, the biblical text of Genesis establishes the basis for absolute monarchy 
through a divine grant of authority to Adam to dominion over the earth.  This divinely ordained 
right of the first man to have dominion over the earth is, on Filmer’s account, extended to the 
dominion of the patriarch over all other persons such that if “Adam himself were still living, and 
now ready to die, it is certain that there is one man, and but one in the world, who is next heir.”11  
Since Adam’s true heir by primogeniture is unknown, “the kingly power escheats in such cases 
to the prime and independent heads of families.”12  By contrast the first woman, Eve is regarded 
as the origin of sin and a curse is placed on her that extends to all women in their subordination 
not only to Adam and his heirs, but to all husbands and fathers.  Indeed, even as to the parentage 
of a child, Filmer argues that mothers may not be permitted to undermine patriarchal authority, 
“it is not the will of the mother to make whom she pleases the father, for if the mother be not in 
possession of a husband, the child is not reckoned to have any father at all.”13  Filmer recognizes 
no parental authority for mothers and puts forth a selective reading of the Ten Commandments to 
support his position that all authority is patriarchal; “we find in the Decalogue that the law which 
enjoins obedience to kings is delivered in terms of ‘honor thy father’ as if all power were 
originally to the father.”14     
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 Filmer recognizes no distinction between the public and the private realms as he regards 
each household as a monarchy in miniature and the whole kingdom as the household of the king-
patriarch.  “There is no differentiation between political authority, paternal authority, and Divine 
authority,” notes Zillah Eisenstein in her summary of Filmer.  Furthermore, “hierarchical 
relations of the family structure the relations of society as well” in the interchangeable roles of 
patriarch and ruler.15  Effectively then, one might argue that there is a kind of negative 
equalitarianism in Filmer’s thought insofar as no subject has any natural right that may be upheld 
against the father-figure king.  To the contrary, Filmer like Hobbes, argues that rights are 
conventions, that is to say, privileges granted by sovereigns just as they see fit. 
 Filmer’s patriarchal politics served as apologetic for the Stuart dynasty.  Yet, James 
Stuart’s immediate predecessor goes unmentioned.  The Stuart ascendancy was, after all, the 
product of Elizabeth Tudor’s childlessness, and Stuart absolutism owed much to her effective 
rule.  Indeed, it is on this point that Locke makes a striking criticism of Filmer, noting that a 
queen as well as a king may hold legitimate sovereignty. Locke’s response to Filmer relies on the 
rightful authority of women as mothers as well as occasional rulers.  Citing both Elizabeth I and 
Mary Tudor, Locke argues that even in the case of a sovereign queen who marries, she may 
retain her position of sovereignty under the terms of the marriage.  Here Locke remarkably 
anticipates the modern role of a prince consort.16  Further, Locke argues that within a family, 
mothers as well as fathers hold authority over children and that a mother’s labor and substance 
are primary responsible for the very life of the child, “the Woman hath an equal share, if not the 
greater, as she nourish the Child a long time in her own Body out of her own Substance.”17  
 Perhaps Locke’s medical training and practice provided him with an enhanced 
understanding, even sympathy, for the painful contribution that mothers make to the process of 
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human reproduction.  Locke went so far as to claim that it “is so hard to imagine the rational 
Soul should presently Inhabit the yet unformed Embrio, as soon as the Father has done his part in 
the Act of Generation, that if it must be supposed to derive anything from the Parents it must 
certainly owe most to the Mother.”18    
 Locke’s title page to the First Treatise announces that the divine right absolute 
monarchist theory of Robert Filmer “overthrown.”19  Filmer argued that the absolute rule of 
seventeenth-century kings was based on the divine grant made to Adam of dominion over the 
earth and all it contains in Genesis 1:28.20  Filmer claims that this authority passes by 
primogeniture through the male line to Adam’s heirs, providing them with a birthright of 
unlimited political power.  As Filmer states the point in Patriarcha, the “lordship which Adam 
by command had over the whole world, and by right descending from him the patriarchs did 
enjoy, was as large and ample as the absolutist dominion of any monarch hath been since the 
creation.”21  This dominion in Filmer’s account is paternal in origin and nature, “Adam was lord 
of his children, so his children under him had a command and power over their own children, but 
still with subordination to the first parent, who is lord-paramount over his children’s children to 
all generations.”22  
Filmer himself acknowledges an obvious weakness in his claim, to the effect that “it may 
seem absurd to maintain that kings now are the father of their people.”23 Nevertheless, his 
arguments served absolutist purposes and significantly reflected his contemporaries received 
understandings of the origins of paternal dominion over wives and children.  In effect, Filmer 
sought to reduce all of political society to patriarchal familial relations.24  Filmer’s purpose was 
to expose the “vulgar opinion” and “desperate assertion” that humanity is “born with freedom 
from all subjection, and to choose what form of government it please”25 as a novel, scholastic, 
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and papist position antithetical to scripture.  By shifting the entire realm of the political into the 
sacrosanct sphere of the patriarchal family, he renders any and all forms of political resistance as 
wicked as a son’s rebellion against paternal authority, which Filmer’s readers would recognize as 
a capital offense per the biblical sanction of Deuteronomy 21:18-22. 
To counter Filmer, Locke’s critique entails much more than a counter to absolute 
monarchism, but a root and branch rejection of the notion that God had actually somehow re-
enforced Adam’s dominion over Eve as a consequence of her sin and the couple’s resultant 
expulsion from Eden.  As Locke puts it, God was “disclaiming his wrath against them both, for 
their disobedience, we cannot suppose that this was the time wherein God was granting Adam 
prerogatives and privileges.”26  Locke is here glossing Genesis 3:16 where Eve is cursed for her 
sin, as rendered in the King James translation, “Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply 
thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be 
to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.”27  Notably however, Filmer’s arguments in 
Patriarcha do not rely upon this passage to establish patriarchy, instead in that text Filmer 
depicts Adam’s dominion as pre-lapsarian and based upon Genesis 1:28 as noted above.  This 
discrepancy between Filmer’s assertion as to the foundation of patriarchal right and Locke’s line 
of counter-argument leads one recent commentator to note that “Eve was subject to Adam before 
he sinned. Political authority, in Filmer’s view, is not at all post-lapsarian remedy for sin.”28  
This points out incisively the extent to which Filmer himself appears to have made a novel 
departure from a traditional Augustinian Christian conception of the origins of political 
authority, yet there is a textual basis for Locke’s focus on Genesis 3:16.  Locke appears to be 
responding to a claim made by Filmer in another text, namely The Anarchy of a Limited or 
Mixed Monarchy (1648) where in polemics against parliamentary authority, Filmer references 
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Genesis 3:16 “where God ordained Adam to rule over his wife, and her desires were to be 
subject to his” and asserts of this scriptural text that it is “the original grant of government.”29  
Filmer is apparently contradictory on this point, for in the very same text he also asserts that 
“Adam was a king from his creation … Eve was subject to Adam before he sinned.”30   
Having a choice, it is certainly easier for Locke to argue against the “guilty” Adam rather 
than the “innocent” one.  It could be claimed, however, that there is no contradiction in Filmer’s 
position, that he read Genesis as granting Adam dominion over all things, including Eve and 
their descendants at 1:28, but that government does not arise until after the Fall and is established 
by Genesis 3:16. If so, then Locke has correctly identified precisely the proper point at which to 
contest Filmer, for Locke’s concern is with the “true original, extent, and end of Civil-
Government” as the Two Treatises title page indicates.  Locke nowhere denies Adam’s natural, 
God-given dominion rather his target is the Filmerian claim that “the original grant of 
government” is a gain, perversely acquired by Adams’ heirs as a result of Adam’s sin.  Correctly 
identifying the point of Locke’s attack on Filmerian biblical interpretation helps to clarify 
Locke’s position, for Locke does not deny the idea of a natural masculine supremacy, but he 
does reject the view that there is a basis in the Genesis account for the patriarchal absolutism in 
either the state or the family.  
Locke describes Eve as “representative” of womankind but claims of her subordination to 
Adam at Genesis 3:16 that “there is here no more law to oblige a woman to subjection.” In other 
words, she is subject to no subject beyond what, in Locke’s view, was the natural balance of the 
relationship of men and women.  “This text gives not, that I see, any authority to Adam over Eve, 
or to men over their wives, but only foretells what should be the woman’s lot; how by his 
providence he would order it so, that she should be subject to her husband … there is, I grant a 
8
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foundation in nature for it.”31 In this oft-quoted passage, Locke effectively affirms the Genesis 1 
assertion of Adam’s dominion and if this section is to be understood as internally coherent, then 
by “he [God] would order it” should be understood to mean that God “foretells” arrange rather 
than commands woman’s subjection, or as the phrase “no more law” would suggest that her 
prelapsarian status as helpmate to man is unaltered by the Fall.  Indeed, Locke notes that with 
regard to the punishment laid upon Eve that her female descendants are under no duty but rather 
should be expected “to endeavour to avoid” the pains of childbirth and may also be “exempt” 
from subjection to a man depending upon “her condition or contract with her husband.”  In other 
words, no woman after Eve need unnecessarily acquiesce nor consent to the fates of suffering 
and subjugation as a result of the curses Eve received for her sin.  Most significant for Locke in 
this is that a female ruler who might wed does not thereby become automatically subject to her 
spouse and that even if wives are understood as by the “laws of mankind and customs of nations” 
subordinate to husbands, this “can only be a conjugal power, not political.”32  This is to say that 
Locke’s purpose in these arguments is to undo Filmer’s reduction of politics to patriarchal 
familialism.33  Yet it must be noted that Locke suggests something more than this.  His 
voluntaristic foundation for the social contract not only applies to politics but also to rendering 
both the state and the family conventional institutions.   
 In response to Filmer’s approach then, Locke denies the natural, divinely ordained quality 
of male authority.  By way of contrast to Filmer’s account, Locke argues that the first sin was the 
mutual responsibility of Adam and Eve.  “God did not intend to reward Adam . . . but to punish 
both.”34  As such, the divine punishment levied on Eve to suffer pain in childbirth should not be 
construed to advantage Adam.  “Eve’s subjection was meant as a punishment for Eve not a 
victory for Adam.”35  Indeed, again perhaps again reflecting his training as a physician, Locke 
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notes that the pains of childbirth may be and should be mitigated by human arts.  Nonetheless, 
while denying that patriarchal authority is by God ordained, Locke does indicate his belief that 
men do play a superior role in families and that this is “foretold” by divine providence in the 
biblical account of the Fall.36   
 Locke’s primary interest as a political theorist was, it should be noted, not to defend the 
rights of women but to undermine the patriarchal argument Filmer used to support absolutism.  
In opposition to patriarchal absolutism, Locke was defending natural rights, especially the right 
of property.  The practical application of his philosophy was to advocate for the rights of fathers 
and sons, of the nobility and the gentry, to maintain their family estates and freeholds from 
nonconsensual expropriation or taxation by the monarchical sovereign.  Locke’s philosophical 
base of operations in his polemic against Filmer is the natural law tradition and the classical 
conception of the state as grounded in reasoned consent.  Locke is theoretically innovative within 
this tradition to the extent that he develops a novel conception of natural rights, regarding these 
as the property of each person in themselves.37  Conceptually, this reverses Filmer’s antimony of 
rights and authority by depicting rights as grounded in nature, while political authority is 
considered as a human artifice. 
Nature, Authority, and Property 
 Locke’s conception of the natural and artificial can be summarized in the following three 
propositions: 
1. Humanity, through God-given reason is capable of becoming cognizant of the natural 
law, including the rights of life, liberty, and self-ownership that each person 
possesses.38 
2. As regulated by the natural law and necessity humanity must associate in order to 
10
International Social Science Review, Vol. 92, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol92/iss1/2
  
preserve the species and take from nature possessions for use.39 
3. Through human art is created a sovereign of limited authority that is designed to 
uphold and protect the natural rights of all persons consenting to the social contract.40 
 While he denied divine ordination of patriarchal kingship, Locke did not deny the natural 
(and therefore in his view, divinely created) quality of human association.  To the contrary, the 
institutions of family and property individually held are depicted as natural necessities.  
Contracts and covenants must be consistent with the natural law otherwise they are null and void.  
The natural law in turn is based upon reason’s understanding of the divine will.  Within the 
bounds of the family and household there is claimed to be a “Foundation in Nature” for “Rule 
[that] . . . naturally falls to the Man’s share, as the abler and the stronger.”41  In the Second 
Treatise, Locke states that there is a natural, as opposed to a consensual or conventional 
foundation for male supremacy.42  As Susan Moller Okin points out, when Locke approaches 
issues related to men’s roles within households in families, he begins to sound 
uncharacteristically Hobbesian, relying on physical strength rather than reason to establish their 
authority.43 Thus, with reference to “their common Interest and Property,” the man rules.  As 
Gordon Schochet notes, Locke “does not seem to have questioned this aspect of the traditional 
patriarchal family.”44  
The husband, father, and/or master as head of household derives benefit from the labor of 
women who may provide progeny and other useful forms of productivity.  Much in the same 
manner as the efforts of servants, which lead to greater accumulation of property for the estate’s 
lord, “thus the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut . . . become my property.”45  
Insofar as Locke regards family as a naturally male-dominated institution, the man’s position 
seemingly upholds the rights of property owner and male head of household in a way that does 
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not require the same standard of limited power as is placed upon the political sovereign.46 
 The Lockean political sovereign is a human artifice, limited in authority by the rational 
consent of the citizens.  The family, on the other hand, is founded in the state of nature.  Locke’s 
assumption was that in families men take a “natural” position of rational decision-maker for the 
family as a whole and direct the disposition of any property holdings.  Similarly, to the extent 
that property is founded in the state of nature as well, it is a right that distinctly favors and 
benefits the head of household who is presumably male, except in the rare Elizabethan instance.  
Woman’s labor in childbirth and the domestic sphere creates no proprietary status for her, no 
more than does the laborer receive the full fruit of toil that is does on behalf and under the charge 
of another.  As we have seen, while Locke credits the “substance” of children more to the mother 
than to the father, this work provides women with no control over their own bodies where 
reproduction is concerned.  Despite his belief that a human fetus lacks soulful consciousness, 
Locke argued in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that abortion, as well as 
infanticide, violate “one’s duty to God-given laws of nature.”47  
 Formally speaking then, women may hold property and even on occasion exercise 
political power, but it is quite unlikely that this will occur with frequency in a society in which 
those estates that provide access to status and public position are a male preserve.  Locke, by 
reconstituting the classical public-private dichotomy reproduced what Pateman has termed the 
“fraternal social contract” which protects the property of fathers and sons, but implicitly denies 
the claims of women and other subordinate household members.48  Locke’s conventional 
assumptions about the fundamental nature of the relationships between women and men work to 
negate his theoretical assertion of natural equality against Filmer’s partriarchalism, with respect 
to those outside the propertied fraternity. 
12
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Locke’s “Liberalism” Reconsidered 
 Political theory has traditionally treated issues of family and domesticity as secondary to 
and distinct from “public” concepts such as the state, sovereignty, nation, property, and law.  
However, there is more than a little irony in this, as both classical and early modern writers have 
treated the family as a primary form of community that either logically or historically preceded 
the polity.  In Locke, the family is portrayed as existing in the pre-political state of nature; “the 
first Society was between Man and Wife.”49  This is not unlike the Aristotelian conception of the 
family and household are treated as the first form of society and are quite literally the economy 
(oikos) in the Greek.  Even so, the ancients like the moderns, distinguished the family-household 
realm from a more rational and male political realm, despite the analogies and parallels between 
the two spheres.  For Locke as for Aristotle, the “first Society” is distinct from and inferior to the 
political realm, “the Master or Mistress of it had some sort of Rule proper to a Family; each of 
these, or all together came short of Political Society, as we shall see if we consider the Ends, 
Tyes, and Bounds of each of these.”50 Hence, the fundamental shortcoming of Filmer, whose 
patriarchal theory collapses the public/private distinction and also the boundary of Locke’s 
relatively egalitarian view of marriage, is set by Locke’s distinction between the conjugal and the 
political.  Consequently, and notwithstanding “a few gestures toward Elizabeth I,” he nowhere 
suggests that women should be participants in politics.”51 As contemporary feminist theorists 
have pointed out, the theoretical divide between the private and the public is gendered in the 
sense that it reflects a division of labor and conceptual distinction between the places of women 
and men.  This dichotomy in turn reinforces the social subordination of women and provides 
ideological support for male domination by associating rationality with the public world.  By 
contrast, private life is depicted as self-interested and characteristically emotive.52   
13
Skidmore-Hess and Skidmore-Hess: “Have we not an equal interest with the men of this nation?”
Published by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository,
  
 While there is a formal equality of persons asserted in Locke’s social contract theory 
there is a practical expectation, as we have seen, that women in the domestic world are subject to 
men.53  In effect then, men as heads of households and families are masters of those who inhabit 
the private sphere; women, servants, children, and as noted above, livestock.  As such, to the 
extent that they are masters of estates, men are in position to act out the potentiality of their 
reason and participate in the political world, at least so far as Locke is concerned, exercising the 
right of liberty.  What might puzzle today’s reader of these texts is the apparent inability of  a 
seventeenth-century “liberal,” as Locke is typically held to be, to recognize the logical 
implications of his own thought.  How it could be plausible that women would consent to any 
form of social contract or marital covenant that would not protect their natural rights is left 
unexplained.  Yet, if women are to be assumed to make such self-abnegating consent, à la the 
Hobbesian subject, then Locke’s own argument against Filmer and absolutism is undermined.  
Perhaps, it is the case with Locke, as with most people, that he simply failed to live up to (or 
indeed, think up to) the logical and moral imperatives of his own beliefs as to do so would 
threaten his own secular interests.  Maybe so, but if we are to continue to treat Locke as the 
source text of modern liberalism then we needs must take seriously his inattention to the 
incipient rights claims of women and men without property.  The extent to which he truly is a 
seminal figure in the history of political thought perhaps depends effectively, albeit not solely, on 
this point.  
 Our historical horizon is in so many ways radically different from Locke’s.  It could be 
argued that we should consider gender equality to be so far removed from Locke’s practical 
considerations that it is anachronistic to read into his work a fundamental contradiction between 
his critique of patriarchy and his assumption of natural male supremacy.  Locke wrote of natural 
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rights and reason as universal components of human nature, yet he presumed that in the main a 
class of men would exercise political power, hold and acquire estates.  After all, in the England 
of Locke’s life and times, children and nearly all women, as well as the majority of men, were 
members of strata that fell below the property line.  As such, they were consigned to a legal 
status little better than domestic beasts, within the household sphere of production and 
reproduction. 
 There is advocacy of neither democracy nor “leveling” to be found in Locke’s work.  As 
such it would be errant to consider him as anything more “modern” than an advocate of a 
republic of limited sovereign power, the citizens of which would be male heads of household.  
The philosophical distance from Locke to the Aristotelian mixed polity is then less than it is from 
Locke to the contemporary advocate of liberal democracy and gender equality.  Locke would 
then be best regarded as a republican critic of absolutism whose thought anticipates, in some 
respects, modern liberalism.  His thought, however, reinforces the privileges of male property 
holders and this point is worth emphasis insofar as he would have been aware of the challenge to 
patriarchal authority that had been presented by more thorough going egalitarian critics of the 
established order. 
 In Locke’s historical context there were indeed significant challenges to sexual and other 
forms of social inequality.  As historians such as C. P. Hill have documented, radical-popular 
religious groups of the seventeenth century, such as the so-called Quakers and Ranters,54 
understood the scriptural concept of the equality of all souls before God to include women as 
well as men.  For these groups, divine inspiration could speak through either sex.  The quote that 
entitles this article is taken from another radical Christian group of the period, the Diggers or 
“True Levellers,” practitioners of a religiously-based communism.55  In this instance, the Digger 
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women were in 1649 petitioning the Parliament on behalf of the men of their faction who had 
been subject to political persecution and arrest.  “Have we not an equal interest with the men of 
this nation in those liberties and securities contained in the ‘Petition of Right,’ and other good 
laws of the land?”56 We might note as well that in the case of the Diggers, the prerogative 
experienced by their men was a primacy in imprisonment by the sovereign authority while the 
Digger women attempted to exercise a citizenly right of petition that had been previously 
asserted by the Puritan leadership against the monarchy.  Cromwell’s parliament was, of course, 
unwilling to extend the same right to their critics “from below.”  Similarly inattentive was the 
Locke of the Two Treatises to the interests of the subaltern members of that society. 
 Our contemporary assessment of Locke should nonetheless acknowledge Locke’s 
philosophical importance within the civic republican tradition and his historically important role 
as a “revolutionary” supporter of Parliamentary ascendancy.57  Locke deployed a universalistic 
language of natural right and law to articulate his position, the far-reaching implications of which 
are still being explored by advocates of human rights, liberal reformers, and democratic radicals 
in our own time.  Nonetheless, this should not preclude modern readers from recognizing the 
ways in which his particularistic concerns limited the practical radicalism (in the sense of going 
to the roots) of his political thought as it was understood and likely intended at the time.  The 
vocabulary of natural rights that Locke developed has shaped modern politics and the state in 
ways that Locke himself never intended nor imagined.58 
 That we now consider it a norm that the state ought to treat women and men as equal 
under the law in status and rights is a Lockean conceptual legacy.  Yet the liberal state did not 
place men and women on an equal footing under law for centuries after Locke.  The concern of 
this essay has so far, been to understand how Locke’s thought both reflects and contributes to 
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these contradictions.  Rather than seek to render Locke’s thought as a coherent whole, it would 
seem more plausible to treat the divergent strands of his thought as products of his complex 
polemical position as critic of absolutism and defender of property rights.  Ultimately, 
contemporary perspectives on Locke should pay due respect to the contribution he made to 
laying the groundwork of formal equality in the liberal state, but note that within the limits of 
Locke’s thought lies a “missed opportunity” for a less particularistic, more coherent and broad 
understanding of the natural rights of women and men.59 A more balanced and perhaps nuanced 
perspective on this may be pursued through an approach to a later, “non-political” text of 
Locke’s.  
                 The Reasonableness of Equality                                             
 
 A better understanding of Locke’s political theory might be gained by study of his later 
religious texts, most specifically, The Reasonableness of Christianity.  This text contains both 
notable parallels and contrasts to his Two Treatises of Civil Government, most specifically with 
the First Treatise, Locke’s critique of Robert Filmer’s patriarchalist theory of absolute 
monarchy, in that both address the implications of the biblical Fall from an original state of 
human kind in the biblical account of the Garden of Eden.  In the key fifth chapter of the First 
Treatise Locke attacks the notion that the subjection of Eve described in Genesis 3 provides a 
basis for the permanent subjection of women to men and the absolute sovereignty of Adam’s 
heirs overall all humanity.  In Reasonableness, Locke challenges received Christian accounts of 
the moral depravity of human will as a result of original sin and its consequent domination of sin 
over human nature.  Locke’s account of natural human freedom as developed in his Second 
Treatise then relies upon his prior demolition of the claim that the Fall led to the establishment of 
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a legitimate form of political domination and this account is consistent with and effectively 
reinforced by the emphasis on free will in his later religious writings. 
 In contrast to the First Treatise, Locke’s 1695 book, The Reasonableness of Christianity 
(hereafter RoC, ) has little, indeed almost nothing to say about woman in general and contains 
sparse references to specific women.  This absence is noteworthy in that RoC is well known for 
its explicit rejection of the doctrine of original sin.  How and to what extent it does so will be 
described in further detail below, what is of note here is the absence of the biblical Eve in 
Locke’s in-depth discussions of “Adam’s sin” as the fall from Edenic Paradise is consistently 
described in the text. 
 Noted biblical scholar Elaine Pagels remarks of Eve that “woman, although created to be 
man’s helper, became his temptress and led him into disaster.”60  In this notable study, Pagels 
provides an account of Christian interpretations of the Genesis narrative from classical to modern 
sources that have been used for patriarchal and misogynist purposes.  As Pagels herself 
“describes the results” of the serpent seduced Eve’s temptation of Adam, who partakes of the 
fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, offered by his wife,  “God himself reinforced 
the husband’s authority over his wife, placing divine sanction upon the social, legal, and 
economic machinery of male domination.”61  
Locke indicates in his discussion of Genesis 3:16 that while Eve is “representative” of 
women, her sin does not deprive women of the freedom and natural rights to resist pain and the 
tyranny of men.  In other words, woman’s nature was not permanently affected by Eve’s sin and 
punishments as orthodox Christian understandings of original sin would have it.  Turning now to 
RoC, there are found striking parallels in the form and language of the arguments, despite Eve’s 
absence from this later text.  Locke in effect prefigured his rejection of original sin in the First 
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Treatise’s discussion of the (non)-subjection of Eve.  In RoC there are three parallel arguments 
that will be discussed here.  These three are notable for their affinity as well as some intriguing 
discrepancies between the texts.  These three are: 
1.  The term “representative” recurs with respect to the commission of the first sin, but 
Adam is said to be not representative of all mankind. 
2. Adam’s descendants are not punished for his sin.  Nor is their moral freedom of 
choice and action thereby affected. 
3. In both texts, Locke relies upon what he terms “unbiased” reading of biblical text to 
criticize established doctrine and theological systems. 
In the first part of RoC, Locke states his purpose is to “understand … what we are 
restored to by Jesus Christ, we must consider what the scripture shews us we lost by Adam.  This 
I thought worthy of a diligent and unbiased search.”62  Here Locke asserts against those “who 
would have all Adam’s posterity doomed, to eternal punishment, for the transgression of Adam” 
that “no one had authorized [Adam] to transact for him, or be his representative.”63  Locke takes 
the view that what humanity “lost by Adam” is immortality.  Locke cites St. Paul twice to the 
effect that death is the consequence of Adam’s sin for Adam and all his descendants.64  However, 
Locke also notes that “for some” death is taken to mean a “state of guilt, wherein not only he 
[Adam] but all his posterity was so involved, that every one descended of him deserved endless 
torment, in hell-fire.”65  In a rhetorical move quite reminiscent of his critique of Filmer, Locke 
notes that “it seems a strange way of understanding a law, which requires the plainest and 
directest words, that by death should be meant eternal life in misery.”  Just as it is unreasonable 
to think that Adam’s status would be aggrandized in relation to Eve by their mutual sin, so too is 
it “strange” in Locke’s judgment to make Adam’s death mean an afterlife of damnation for his 
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descendants.  Similarly, against the Calvinist notion of original sin as moral depravity, Locke 
notes the irrationality of regarding Adam’s sin as leading to “a state of necessary sinning” by his 
descendants.  To counter this, Locke again employs his plain reading of scripture method against 
this “yet harder sense of the word death” which he again describes as “this strange 
interpretation” that “the Righteous God be supposed as a punishment for one sin wherewith he is 
displeased to put a man under a necessity of sinning continually.”66  
As described above, the assertion that Locke rejects the doctrine of original sin means 
that he rejects notions that humanity bears any moral guilt or that human nature was altered with 
regard to our normative freedom in consequence of the first sin as described in the Genesis 
narrative.  Failing and falling from “the state of perfect obedience, which is called justice” as 
Locke describes the condition of Edenic humanity, Locke concludes the first part of his 
discussion with the claim that “every one’s sin is charged upon himself only.”67  It should be 
noted however, that Adam’s descendants do on Locke’s account suffer a devastating loss for 
Adam’s sin, namely access to the Tree of Life and thereby immortality.  Yet this, Locke claims is 
no punishment.  To the contrary, he asserts that mortality is not punishment for the reason that 
mortal life is still better than “not to have been born” although “a state of extreme irremediable 
torment is worse than no being at all.”68  In other words, by having mortal life without original 
sin we have receive a divine gift, but to have been given a life in which we bear the inherent guilt 
of original sin and lack moral free will would place in jeopardy of a fate worse than non-
existence. 
Locke envisions Adam’s death as permanent non-existence, what might be described as 
soul-death, but this he claims is just “what we are restored to by Jesus  Christ,” namely eternal 
life, which we may regain by the justification of faith in Jesus Christ and by repentance for our 
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individual sins.  The text of RoC is largely taken up with working out the implications of the 
rejection of original sin that is made in the opening sections.  He is largely concerned with 
determining what it is necessary in Christianity to believe in order to receive salvation.  Without 
the doctrine of original sin, the expiation of sin by the crucifixion no longer plays a central 
theological role.  The moral teachings of Jesus and his apostles are emphasized instead and 
described as complete and superior to all schools of philosophy as means to human happiness.  
This shift in emphasis led in Locke’s day (and continues to do so in ours) to speculation and 
debate about Locke’s actual theological position.   
Claims were and are made that Locke rejected not only original sin but also the doctrine 
of the Trinity (which he does not treat as a necessary belief, but neither does he reject it), and if 
he was a non-Trinitarian then he may be taken for a “Socinian” or Unitarian who did not accept 
the divinity of Christ.69  That the text was admired and used by Unitarians and other eighteenth-
century religious rationalists is historical fact.  However, to elide Locke’s position with sixteenth 
and seventeenth-century Socianism, Unitarianism, or even atheism, is to ignore not only the 
text’s opening statement of seeking to understand what we have regained through Christ, but also 
its concluding claim of the central significance of  the resurrection of Jesus Christ.  At that 
penultimate point in the text, the figure of woman makes one of her infrequent appearances.  She 
is the personification of virtue whose beauty was “unendowed” until “a perfect complete life of 
eternal duration” was “given us” as “unquestionable assurance and pledge” for those who believe 
that Jesus was the Messiah and Son of God, repent their sins, and follow the moral teachings of 
gospel.70  Locke’s theological position seems much more clearly to shift Christian focus from a 
theology of the crucifixion to a theology of the resurrection, a focus that on some accounts is 
distinctly more compatible with a practice of religious toleration.71   
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The Resurrection reveals for Locke that path by which we might attain the eternal 
happiness of everlasting life.  In other words, we can rise from the second level to the highest 
place on Locke’s scale: eternal happiness, mortal life, non-existence, eternal misery.  Again, a 
notable parallel can be seen between RoC and the Two Treatises in which Locke describes a 
similar hierarchy within the realm of mortal life: civil society, state of nature, tyranny.  In this 
parallelism, the Lockean social contract is analogous to faith; the consensual contract provides a 
means to earthly preservation of natural rights while faith facilitates the way to eternal life.  Both 
Christian salvation and political society must be non-coercive and just as the state of nature is not 
a state of war, mortal earthly life is a far better state than eternal torment.  Similarly, life under a 
tyrant is worse than the state of nature, as it is a state of war in which the individual’s freedom 
and self-preservation are denied and rendered almost impossible.  Robert Goldwin provides an 
apt metaphor in his explication of Locke, that humanity’s political quest, from a Lockean point 
of view, is to “avoid falling back into the state of nature.”72  Tyranny, then is earthly hell, while 
the state of nature is akin to the sleep of death from which we can be resurrected by faith and the 
covenant of grace/depart from via consent to a social contract and enter into the advantages of 
political society.  The rational ends of Christianity are homologous to those of Civil Government, 
the fundamental difference of course being that earthly advance takes place within a mortal 
realm and as such is reversible through tyranny and renewable through revolution, while the 
salvation which Locke sees offered by Jesus is eternal. 
Following Locke’s own suggestion about scripture, we could parallel RoC and the Two 
Treatises and “observe the coherence and connexion of the parts”73 of the larger structure of 
Locke’s political theology.  For Locke, the sum of all goods is eternal life in God’s grace.74  
Politics has a vital “part” within this larger “coherence” of facilitating happiness, but Locke’s 
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ultimate goal is not secular unless we would describe him as a “Christian hedonist” who would 
make all mankind happy by appealing to what he claims is reasonable faith in Jesus the messiah 
and the morality of the gospel.  In Locke’s view, Christianity brings salvation through the 
resurrection but those who lived before the time of Christ and those who have never heard the 
gospel, are not consigned to eternal outer darkness because all have a “spark of the divine 
nature” and an ability to understand our natural moral “duty” that leads away from perdition.75  
In response, to his own question, “What advantage have we by Jesus Christ?”76  Locke claims 
that the morality taught by Jesus and his apostles “tends entirely to the good of mankind and that 
all would be happy, if all would practice it.”77  The text does not end with this but continues a 
progression from earthly happiness to the promise of eternal resurrection in what has been 
already described above as its penultimate claim. 
Locke falls within the tradition of those who have sought to reconcile reason and 
revelation but with the crucial difference that he rejects the use of systematic theology.  For 
Locke, there is no need to be a philosopher to enter into the Kingdom, rather he associates such 
an approach with priestcraft and treats both as obstacles moral understanding.  Such 
understanding, as already noted, is available through natural reason, just a natural law is 
available as reason in the state of nature to those who will but consult it.  Turning to the Bible as 
his sole source for illumination of the necessities of faith, Locke notes that it may reveal many 
other truths, some even very obscure,78 but his concern is to identify the requisites of 
justificatory Christian faith in a plain manner that is comprehendible to the ploughman and the 
digger (and he adds parenthetically, “the other sex”).79  
At the conclusion of RoC we find another of the text’s scant references to woman.  In the 
penultimate discussion of the resurrection she appeared “endowed” with virtue, now her 
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appearance is parenthetical, a seeming afterthought but again in the abstract not as a concrete 
woman or women, she is like the “hand [that] is used to the plough and the spade” the other of 
those who are exercised in “mysterious reasonings.”  She is now unendowed by education, but 
the way to eternal happiness is as available to her as to any man. 
As suggested above, Locke’s political theology is conducive of a tolerationist viewpoint.  
The claim made here is that a better understanding of Locke’s political thought may be arrived at 
through a study of RoC and Locke’s other late religious texts.  As Locke’s recent biographer 
notes, in his last year Locke was working on his commentaries on Paul’s epistles as well as A 
Fourth Letter for Toleration.80   Beyond the parallels between RoC and the Two Treatises, it 
should be noted also that there is an affinity between the argument of RoC and A Letter 
Concerning Toleration.  Here again, Locke is seeking the minimum necessary to salvation from 
civil strife and religious warfare.81 Central to Locke’s argument for toleration is his insistence 
that “toleration is the mark of a true Church.”82  Here again, the pattern of Locke’s thought is 
“liberal” Christian yet minimalist in its dogmatic demands, reserving its restrictions for what he 
regarded as the irrationality of priestcraft and atheism, imprecise perhaps in its Christological 
viewpoint and ambiguous already to his contemporaries with regard to just how much liberty 
Locke had taken in his challenge to patriarchal “authority and jurisdiction.” 
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